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COMMENTS
PROVIDING CONSUMER RELIEF FROM DISCLAIMERS
INTRODUCTION
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code was drafted in part to cor-
rect the defects of common law warranty.' Even a cursory glance,
however, will reveal that the consumer would be in an extremely diffi-
cult position if he had to rely completely upon the Code to recover for a
defective product. Fortunately, statutory and case law has developed
to provide additional protection and to cure the defects of the Code. 2
An examination of these developments exposes an only marginally im-
proved recovery for the uninjured consumer with a defective product.3 A
primary culprit in the failure of consumer advocates to obtain adequate
redress has been the persistence of a belief in "freedom of contract."'4 It
is a principal tenet of this theory that restraints should be minimal in the
market-place so that individuals are free to negotiate the terms of their
contracts. However, such a theory can only operate in a market com-
posed of persons in relatively equal bargaining positions. Without such
equality "free" contracts become adhesion contracts.
While it is true that collectively the American consumer wields a great
deal of potential power, the consumer enters into contracts for the pur-
chase of consumer goods on an individual basis with negligible bargain-
1. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960); Prosser,
The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966); Shanker, Strict Tort
Theory of Products Liability and the Uniform Commercial Code, 17 W. REss. L.
REV. 5, 21 (1965).
2. See pp. 802-803 infra.
3. The predicament of the consumer in this article will only be concerned
with "economic harm," that is, "damages for inadequate value, costs of repair and
replacement of the defective product or consequent loss of profits." Note, 66
COLUM. L. REV. 917 (1966). UCC §§ 2-711, 2-714, 2-715.
4. Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Con-
tract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943); 34 ALBANY L. REV. 339, 351 (1970).
From the consumer's point of view, another glaring defect in Article 2 is that it
regulates "contracts for the sale of goods" and does not cover sales of services
and consumer leases. Some courts have implied a warranty by common law
analogy to the warranties applicable to goods. See, e.g., W.E. Johnson Equipment
Co. v. United Airlines, Inc., 238 So.2d 98 (Fla. 1970).
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ing power to assert against the seller. Most consumer transactions are
impersonal and involve form contracts, the terms of which are seldom
subject to change. The consumer's "freedom to contract" consists of
being able to make the decision whether to buy or not to buy.5 Al-
though he is the least able to assume the risk of defective products, he
must do so when he makes the decision to purchase. Certainly a major
contributor to this predicament is the warranty disclaimer, for it is through
standardized disclaimer clauses, which sellers can force upon the con-
sumer because of their superior bargaining positions, that sellers may
completely avoid liability for defective products which have not caused
injuries.
This paper will examine the nature of warranty protection under the
Uniform Commercial Code; disclaimers; how disclaimers operate to the
detriment of the consumer; and the remedial tacks which have been pro-
posed, tried, and failed. It will become apparent that warranty protec-
tion under the Code is largely illusory and the evidence will sufficiently
demonstrate the necessity for a National Warranty Act, which is provided
as a conclusion to this paper.
DISCLAIMERS AND WARRANTY PROTECTION
While section 2-316(1) apparently protects the consumer from the
negation of express warranties, 6 this protection is subject to the parol
evidence rule. 7 Almost all major consumer sales transactions involve a
writing which is intended by the parties as "the final expression of their
agreement" and many standard contract forms have a printed integra-
tion clause which brings that contract under the parol evidence rule,8
5. Even this is not a meaningful choice considering the fine distinction be-
tween a "necessary" and a "luxury" item.
6. UCC § 2-316(1). "Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an ex-
press warranty and words or conduct tending to negate or limit warranty shall be
construed wherever reasonable as consistent with each other; but subject to the
provisions of this Article on parol or extrinsic evidence negation or limitation is in-
operative to the extent that such construction is unreasonable."
7. UCC § 2-202. "Terms with respect to which the confirmatory memo-
randa of the parties agree or which are otherwise set forth in a writing intended
by the parties as a final expression of their agreement with respect to such terms
as are included therein may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement
or of a contemporaneous oral agreement but may be explained or supplemented
(a) by course of dealing or usage of trade (Section 1-205) or by course of per-
formance (Section 2-208); and (b) by evidence of consistent additional terms un-
less the court finds the writing to have been intended also as a complete and
exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement."
8. 34 ALBANY L. REV. 339, 348 (1970): "[T]his order (contract) cancels
and supersedes any prior agreement and as of the date hereof comprises the corn-
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thereby excluding any oral express warranties. In order to avoid the ef-
fect of the parol evidence rule on a contract without an integration clause,
the consumer has the difficult burden of showing the existence of the ex-
press warranty, the presence of fraud, or that the writing was not intended
as the final expression of agreement. It is manifest, therefore, that
the consumer can find little solace in express warranties under the Code.
The implied warranty of merchantability 9 may be disclaimed by a
conspicuous writing which mentions "merchantability."' 10 The implied
warranty of fitness" may be disclaimed by a conspicuous writing.' 2
The underlying assumption of these requirements for effective disclaim-
ers of implied warranties is that the seller may legitimately avoid liabil-
ity for defective merchandise if the buyer is provided adequate notice.'
Consequently, section 2-316(3) provides logical exceptions to these spe-
cific and conspicuous notice requirements: (1) any language which in
"common understanding" would call the buyer's attention to the exclu-
sion of liability; (2) if the buyer has examined or refused to examine the
product, implied warranties are excluded as to those defects which an
examination would have revealed; (3) course of dealing or usage of the
trade may extinguish implied warranties.
From the standpoint of the consumer there are many problems in-
volved with section 2-316. One of the more obvious of these problems
is the fact that even if the seller complies with the requirements pro-
vided by the Code for an effective disclaimer, it is unlikely whether any-
thing meaningful has been communicated to the buyer. 14  It is difficult
for an attorney, for example, to explain the meahing of merchantability
plete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement relating to the subject
matters covered hereby...." It is also a common practice to refer to a new ve-
hicle warranty in a sales contract which disclaims express warranties. This dis-
claimer voids all other warranties except the new vehicle warranty. Note, 2
VAL. L. REV. 358 (1968). See Sterling-Midland Coal Co. v. Great Lakes Coal and
Coke Co., 334 Ill. 281, 165 N.E. 793 (1929) wherein the court held the following
clause to be sufficient to exclude express warranties: "[Tlhere are no under-
standings or agreement relative to this contract or its subject matter that are not
fully expressed herein." See also Tracy v. Vinton Motors, Inc., 130 Vt. 512,
296 A.2d 269 (1972) in which the oral representations of a salesman were
barred as a basis for recovery for a defective paint job, since the written contract
disclaimed any warranty not acknowledged in the written agreement.
9. UCC § 2-314.
10. UCC § 2-316(2).
11. UCC § 2-315.
12. UCC § 2-316(2). "There are no warranties which extend beyond the
description on the face hereof."
13. UCC § 2-302, Comment 1; See 34 ALBANY L. REV. 339, 350 (1970).
14. Shanker, supra note 1, at 41.
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without a lengthy, complex discussion of section 2-314. Even in the
unlikely situation where the seller specifically draws the attention of the
buyer to the disclaimer, it is improbable that the consumer has any real
understanding of the ramifications of that clause. Even if the consumer
does understand the significance of the disclaimer, there is little he can
do about it as he is almost completely without bargaining power and
almost all consumer products are offered to the public on a "take-it-or-
leave-it" basis. By providing specific requirements which must be met
to adequately disclaim liability, the drafters of the Code have not provided
the consumer with protection, but have merely provided a means
whereby a manufacturer may prepare standard disclaimer clauses.
LIMITATION OF REMEDIES AND WAIVER OF DEFENSE CLAUSES
There are two other provisions in the Code which accentuate the diffi-
culties consumers have with disclaimers. First, section 2-719 allows the
parties to specify their own remedies and specifically authorizes the limi-
tation of remedies to repair or replacement of the goods. 15 The only
check to this provision is section 2-719(2) which provides that if the
remedy as limited "fails of its essential purpose," it may be struck down
by the courts and the buyer may resort to other remedies as provided
elsewhere in the Code. 6 However, this section is operative only if the
buyer is deprived of the "substantial value of the bargain," which pre-
sents a difficult burden of proof. Consequently, sellers have success-
fully limited the remedies of their buyers through form contracts. Con-
sumers, uninformed of their legal remedies, believe that they are helpless.
The second section of the Code which further burdens the consumer
is 9-206 which authorizes waiver of defense clauses. These clauses contain
stipulations that the buyer will not assert defenses or claims against the
assignee which he may have against the assignor. They are particu-
larly onerous because of the prevalence of installment purchases where
the usual practice is for the holder of the note to discount the instru-
ment to a finance company or bank which usually has holder in due course
status.' 7 In such a situation, if the buyer has purchased a defective
product on an installment plan, he must continue payment of his obliga-
15. UCC § 2-719(l)(a).
16. UCC § 2-719(2) and Comment 1.
17. UCC § 3-305. A holder in due course takes the instrument free from
personal defenses but subject to the real defenses of infancy, incapacity, duress,
illegality, insolvency, misrepresentation in the inducement, and any other dis-
charge of which the holder has notice.
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tion to the finance company or bank regardless of the assignor's (seller's)
breach of warranty.' 8
There is an increasing trend both in the legislatures 9 and in the
courts20 to invalidate these clauses. The most comprehensive recent
treatment of the waiver of defense clauses has been presented in the form
of a proposed trade regulation rule by the Federal Trade Commission. 21
This rule would: (1) prohibit sellers from honoring credit cards which
required the holder to waive the right to assert claims or defenses against
the issuer; (2) prohibit financing by a creditor who is closely related 22 to
18. It is also a common practice for applications for credit cards to contain
clauses which obligate the holder to continue payments despite problems which
may arise as a result of purchases while using the card.
19. Twelve states have enacted legislation specifically providing that such
clauses are unenforceable in contracts for the sale of goods and five states impose
some restrictions on the form of the clause or require that the assignee meet cer-
tain standards. Twenty-five states, however, have not spoken on the issue. See
Note, 31 U. PTT. L. REV. 687, 689 nn. 8, 9, 10 (1970); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN.
ch. 255, § 12(c) (Supp. 1969); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 6-27-6 (1968). ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 12112, § 517 (Supp. 1970) invalidates waiver of defense clauses if
the "assignee or holder has actual knowledge or has received notice from its
course of dealing with the seller or from its own records of substantial complaints
by other buyers that seller has failed or refused to perform his agreements with
such buyers within a reasonable time after such complaints are made." Uniform
Consumer Credit Code § 2.404, alternative A makes waiver of defense clauses un-
enforceable; alternative B provides limited protection for the assignee.
20. See, e.g., Fairfield Credit Corp. v. Donnelly, 158 Conn. 543, 264 A.2d 547(1967) holding that waiver of defense clauses in consumer-goods conditional sales
contracts are void as against public policy; Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d
405 (1967); Quality Finance Co. v. Hurley, 337 Mass. 150, 148 N.E.2d 385 (1958).
Illinois has typically deferred to the legislature for further action to invalidate the
clauses. See The First National Bank of Elgin v. Husted, 57 Ill. App. 2d 227, 205
N.E.2d 780 (1965). See also G.E. Credit Corp. v. Hoey, 7 UCC Rep. Serv. 156(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970). Waiver of defense clauses have also been invalidated due to
the "close connection" between the assignor and the assignee or due to facts which
indicate that he took with notice of existing defenses or claims. Vasquez v.
Superior Ct. of San Joaquin County, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 484 P.2d 964, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796(1971); Gross v. Appelgren, 171 Colo. 7, 467 P.2d 789 (1970). At least two courts
have indicated in dicta that some fact patterns may provide an unconscionability
argument against waiver of defense clauses. Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d
405 (1967); Block v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 286 A.2d 228 (D.C. Cir. 1972)(some evidence of the availability of alternative forms of financing would be neces-
sary for the consideration of unconscionability). But see Capitol Dodge, Inc. v.
Haley, - Ind. App. - [33 Ind. Dec. 388], 288 N.E.2d 766 (1972) where automo-
bile purchasers brought an action against a seller for fraudulent misrepresentation
of insurance coverage afforded by the purchase contract. The court held that the
misrepresentation did not preclude recovery of the deficiency balance by the financ-
ing agency.
21. 38 Fed. Reg. 892 (1973).
22. The proposed rule defines a related creditor: Any person, partnership, cor-
poration or association which is engaged in making loans to consumers to enable
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the seller unless the buyer is permitted to assert the same claims and de-
fenses against the creditor as he could against the seller; (3) prohibit
consumers from making agreements which would prevent him from assert-
ing any claims or defenses against a creditor; (4) prohibit agreements
which provide a time period for raising claims and defenses which is
shorter than the time period provided for the installment payments;
(5) provide for a notice to be supplied to the consumer when a con-
sumer note is used which provides the rights and remedies of the con-
sumer; and (6) provide for a provision in consumer notes which noti-
fies subsequent holders of that note that they may be subject to any claims
or defenses which the consumer may have against the seller.
This rule, if adopted by the Commission, would be a significant step to-
ward relieving the burden upon the consumer. 23  It will not, of course, be
payment to be made for consumer goods or services and which either participates
in or is directly connected with the consumer transaction. Without limiting the
scope of the immediately preceding language, there shall be a rebuttable presump-
tion that a creditor is a related creditor under any one of the following circum-
stances:
(1) the creditor is a person related by blood or marriage to the seller or to the
seller's spouse.
(2) the creditor prepared, supplied or furnished the seller with the forms or docu-
ments used to evidence or secure the consumer loan.
(3) the seller prepared, supplied or furnished the creditor with the forms or docu-
ments used to evidence or secure the consumer loan.
(4) the creditor is directly or indirectly controlled by, under common control of,
or is otherwise affiliated with the seller.
(5) the creditor and the seller are engaged in a joint venture to produce con-
sumer obligations payable either directly or by transfer to the creditor.
(6) the creditor directly or indirectly pays the seller any consideration for the
referral of consumer borrowers.
(7) the seller guaranteed the consumer loan or otherwise assumed the risk of loss
by the creditor upon the loan.
(8) the creditor made five or more loans within a 1 year period, the proceeds of
which were used in transactions with the same seller following referral of the con-
sumer to the creditor by the seller.
(9) (i) the creditor knew or had reason to know that the loan proceeds would
be used in whole or in substantial part to pay the seller for an obligation of the
consumer, and (ii) the creditor had notice that the seller failed or refused to per-
form contracts with consumers, or failed to remedy complaints within a reasonable
time.
This section of the proposed rule provides the most comprehensive and significant
relief for the consumer.
23. It has been argued that an invalidation of waiver of defense clauses will
merely result in the lessening of available credit. However, in 1947 Pennsylvania
enacted the Motor Vehicle Sales Financing Act, PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 69, §§ 601-637
(1965) which denies holder in due course status to assignees of installment con-
tracts for the purchase of cars. It has been noted that such contracts have con-
tinued to be marketed freely. See Note, 31 U. Pnrr. L. REV. 687, 709 (1970).
It is also argued that eliminating waiver of defense clauses places an unfair burden
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effective unless the consumer has any claims or defenses against the
seller. It will not, therefore, provide any meaningful relief if the seller
has adequately disclaimed his liability.
UNCONSCIONABILITY
Some legal commentators have suggested that section 2-30224 can be
used to strike down all disclaimers.25 While it may be true that the un-
conscionability clause can be used to invalidate unconscionable dis-
claimers, 26 it is unlikely that the clause can be used to provide more
meaningful relief to the consumer by striking valid disclaimers. 27  The
draftsmen did not intend that the courts could freely disturb the "al-
location of risks [merely] because of superior bargaining power; '28
rather, the goal of this section was to prevent surprise and oppression.2 9
But how can a buyer show surprise when the seller has complied with
the conspicuous requirements of 2-316? How can a consumer claim op-
pression when he has been provided statutory notice?
on the financing company. But nothing prohibits the assignor and the assignee
from making their contract "with full recourse."
24. UCC § 2-302(1). If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any
clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made, the
court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the
contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of
any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
25. Murray, Unconscionability: Unconscionability, 31 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 48
(1969); Shanker, supra note 1, at 43-45 suggests that disclaimer of implied war-
ranty of merchantability may be prima facie unconscionable.
26. No court has so held. See William v. American Motor Sales Co. &
Chrysler Corp., 44 Erie Co. L.J. 51 (Ct. of Common Pleas), 1 UCC Rep. Serv.
100 (1961); Schwartz, A Products Liability Primer, 33 AM. TRIAL LAW. 1. 64,
92 (1970) mistakenly cites Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 298 N.Y.S.2d 538, 59 Misc.
2d 241 (Sup. Ct. 1969) as holding 2-316 disclaimer prima facie unconscionable.
27. Accord, Hawkland, Limitation of Warranties Under the UCC, 11 How. L.J.
28 (1965); Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause,
115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 523 (1967) where the author argues that if 2-316 is com-
plied with, unconscionability is inapplicable: "Here is 2-316 which sets forth clear,
specific and anything but easy-to-meet standards for disclaiming warranties. It is
a highly detailed section, the comments to which disclose full awareness of the
problem at hand. It contains no reference of any kind to 2-302, although nine
other sections of Article 2 contain such references. In such circumstances the
usually bland assumptions that a disclaimer which meets the requirements of 2-316
might still be strikable as 'unconscionable' under 2-302 seems explainable, if at
all, as oversight, wishful thinking or (in a rare case) attempted sneakiness." See
also UCC § 2-719, Comment 3.
28. UCC § 2-302, Comment 1. See generally K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON
LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 369 (1960).
29. UCC § 2-302, Comment 1.
[Vol. XXII800
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It is highly unrealistic to depend on 2-302 to provide relief for the
consumer from the disclaimer even if these objections could be over-
come. 30 The development of the case law in this area has been very
meager and disappointing. When the doctrine of unconscionability has
been applied, extremely high pressure situations which exclude the av-
erage consumer transaction have been involved. 31  A great number of
courts have turned in frustration to the theory of strict liability in tort3 2 to
provide relief, thereby avoiding the Uniform Commercial Code and 2-316
entirely.33
THE TORT-CONTRACT CONFUSION
If the concept of a uniform commercial code is desirable in sales law,
then some re-evaluation of the direction the courts are taking when pre-
30. The greatest difficulty is that no one seems to know what unconscionability
is-Professor Murray calls it the "unconscionability muddle." Murray provides a
three-step analysis based on the assent of the purchaser for determining whether
unconscionability may be used. Murray, supra note 25, at 60. The question from
the consumer's standpoint is whether anyone should ever be able to assent to a de-
fective product. If the answer to this question is negative, then disclaimers are un-
conscionable per se. The Code obviously did not wish to go this far.
31. Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (1966);
Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Company, 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
Cases which involve exorbitant prices have been the primary target of the use of
2-302. But these cases have merely produced more confusing language primarily
because the question of what is an excessive price is really a question of what is
excessive profit, thereby introducing the problems and complexities of anti-trust
cases. See generally 20 ME. L. REV. 159 (1968); 22 CATHOLIC U.L. REV. 187
(1972).
32. The courts had previously turned to strict liability in tort for relief from the
privity requirements in contract suits for breach of warranty. In response to this
movement away from the Code, the drafters offered three alternatives to section
2-318. See generally Note, 12 WM. & MARY L. REV. 895 (1971). It is interesting
to note at this point that jurisdictions which have adopted strict liability in tort
have done so largely as a response to the work of Dean Prosser. It has been
noted that this is an example of judicial willingness to consult well-developed pro-
fessional literature when custom fails. A similar development may occur with
unconscionability as there is voluminous literature on point.
33. A number of other individuals have turned to further legislation to provide
the answer-the dispute between Professors Murray and Leff is really an argument
about the appropriate forum for resolving the difficulties with unconscionability.
Murray claims that the legislature has expressly delegated to the courts the task of
interpreting 2-302 (this view finds support in Comment 1), but as Leff appropri-
ately demonstrates, this means that the seller only loses if the buyer chooses to
litigate. Is it not better to face the offensive clauses (including disclaimers) and
regulate them out of existence? Leff, Unconscionability and the Crowd-Consum.
ers and the Common Law Tradition, 31 U. PrTr. L. REV. 349, 354 (1970).
It has also been suggested that violations of legislation such as the Uniform
Deceptive Trade Practices Act could be prima facie evidence of 2-302. See also
H.B. 1381, 78th General Assembly of the State of Illinois (1973) which would
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sented with a consumer with a defective product (with liability ade-
quately disclaimed) is needed. Hence, the courts have in many cases
realized that an injustice is being perpetuated upon the consumer by the
denial of adequate remedies against manufacturers who sell defective
products, and, seeking to correct this injustice, the courts have chosen
generally two courses of action: (1) they have ignored the Code alto-
gether and applied tort law;3 4 (2) they have distinguished the provi-
sions of section 2-316 to such an extent that it is difficult to see how a
manufacturer can adequately extinguish or limit his liability. 3  Other
courts, of course, have refused to provide any relief, thereby compound-
ing the confusion and uncertainty.3 6
In 1965 two state supreme courts vividly demonstrated the confusion
of legal theories while granting relief to consumers with defective prod-
ucts. Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc.37 granted the most favor-
able relief to the consumer-plaintiff. While the New Jersey Supreme
Court awarded damages based on the implied warranty of merchant-
ability, it characterized the contract between the manufacturer and an ul-
allow courts to set aside consumer contracts which violate certain standards of
unconscionability to be set out in the bill. Rep. Richard A. Mugalian and Sen.
Philip J. Rock are the sponsors of this bill.
34. See generally Kessler, The Protection of the Consumer Under Modern
Sales Law, 74 YALE L.J. 262 (1964); Shanker, supra note 1. Note, 114 U. PA. L.
REV. 539 (1966); Note, 12 WM. & MARY L. REV. 895 (1971); Note, 77 HARV. L.
REV. 318 (1963); Franklin, When Worlds Collide: Liability Theories and Dis-
claimers in Defective-Product Cases, 18 STAN. L. REV. 974 (1966). At least one
author is not bothered at all by the mixture in theories, the contract being the
"occasion for the tort," Bayne, Replacement vs. Repair: A Consumer's Brief Chal-
lenges General Motors, 24 SYRACUSE L. REV. 639 (1973). See also Prosser,
The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MINN. L. REV. 791, 804 (1966): "[C]ourts at once
agreed that the proper theory was not one of warranty at all, but simply a strict
liability in tort divorced from any contract rules. The number of them is already
sufficient to make it reasonably certain that this is the law of the immediate and
the distant future. There are still courts which have continued to talk the language
of 'warranty;' but the forty-year reign of the word is ending, and it is passing
quietly down the drain."
35. S-C Industries v. American Hydroponics Systems, Inc., 468 F.2d 852 (5th
Cir. 1972); Media Production Consultants, Inc. v. Mercedes-Benz of North Amer-
ica, Inc., 262 La. 80, 262 So.2d 377 (1972).
36. L.O. Whybark Co. v. Haley, 37 I11. App. 2d 22, 184 N.E.2d 798 (1962);
Construction Aggregates Corp. v. Hewitt-Robbins, Inc., 404 F.2d 505 (7th Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 921 (1969).
37. 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965). Following the precedent of Santor,
the New Jersey District Court broadly stated the position of the New Jersey courts:
"The theory of the courts in New Jersey is to place an enterprise liability upon a
manufacturer; so that a manufacturer is liable for defective products which it has
placed into the channels of trade, and this irrespective of the relationship, if any,
between the manufacturer and the aggrieved party." Fashion Novelty Corp. of
N.J. v. Cocker Machine and Foundry Co., 331 F. Supp. 960, 965 (D.C. N.J. 1971).
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timate consumer as "hybrid, having its commencement in contract and
its termination in tort."38  Chief Justice Traynor, while providing eco-
nomic relief for the consumer-plaintiff in Seely v. White Motor Co.,39
maintained that tort law was developed to deal with the problem of
physical injuries, while sales law was intended to govern commercial re-
lationships. Justice Peters, however, in a concurring opinion, argued that
tort law should apply in a "consumer sale" and sales law in a "commer-
cial sale."' 40 Both the Santor court and Justice Peters in Seely are ap-
parently unconcerned about the effect their holdings may have on a fully
developed set of statutes which were available to settle the controversies
in question.4' As Professor Franklin has pointed out: "At best, we have
judicial lack of awareness of the possible relevance of sales law. At worst,
we have open judicial defiance of apparent statutory commands. '42
In a more recent case, Hawkeye Security Insurance Co. v. Ford Motor
Co., the Iowa Supreme Court took judicial notice of the "seeming" con-
flict between tort and warranty recoveries. 43 Justice Rees maintained that
given the proper fact situation, both theories could be pursued in the
same action. However, he proceeds to confuse his discussion by quoting
from Justice Traynor and Justice Peters, without attempting to resolve
the conflict inherent in their views, and concludes that both theories
should be allowed since both are designed to meet the "needs of so-
ciety." 44
38. id. at 64, 207 A.2d at 311.
39. 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965). See also Melody
Home Manuf. Co. v. Morrison, 455 S.W.2d 825 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970) where the
court refused to apply tort law to an "economic loss" situation; accord, Thermal
Supply of Texas, Inc. v. Asel, 468 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971).
40. 63 Cal. 2d at 27-29, 403 P.2d at 157-58, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 29-30. There is
at least some support in the UCC for evidence that the drafters intended con-
sumer transactions to be governed by different principles than those which govern
transactions among businessmen. UCC § 9-101 and Comments. A consumer was
awarded damages for economic loss from a defective product in Cova v. Harley
Davidson Motor Co., 26 Mich. App. 602, 182 N.W.2d 800 (1971) (this case also
contains a good discussion about all the confusing theories).
41. Professor Shanker has called this apparent lack of concern a "judicial
eclipse." Shanker, supra note 1, at 8. At least one legal commentator has sug-
gested that there is "a certain judicial impropriety in ignoring a statute dealing
with substantially the same area as the case before the court." Note, 114 U. PA.
L. REV. 539, 549 (1966).
42. Franklin, supra note 34, at 979. Professor Franklin also suggests that
with the publication of the Second Restatement of Torts §§ 402 A and 402 B,
more courts are likely to apply tort theory in spite of the applicability of the
Code. Id. at 989 n.89.
43. 199 N.W.2d 373, 381 (Ia. 1972).
44. 199 N.W.2d at 382.
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Case law has, therefore, made it difficult for the manufacturer to pre-
dict the consequences of his contractual relationships with consumers.
While he can rely on some courts to literally apply the provisions of 2-316
to his form contracts which comply with the requirements for adequate
disclaimers, he is also likely to encounter very narrow constructions of
the disclaimer which deny protection for rather improvised reasons. In
Rehureck v. Chrysler Credit Corp., for example, the disclaimer was held
ineffective because it was on the back page of a retail installment con-
tract in small print even though the buyer had actually read the clause.45
The conspicuous disclaimer in the manufacturer's warranty booklet
has been held insufficient to disclaim implied warranty by the dealer
and ineffective against the purchaser because it was given to him after
the sale. 46 At least one court has held an otherwise effective disclaimer
invalid because the buyer had not actually been shown the clause.47
Many groups and individuals have despaired over the muddle in the
courts and turned to legislation as the solution. The National Consumer
Act, for example, flatly prohibits all warranty disclaimers or limita-
tions on remedies available to the consumer due to breach of warranty.4 8
Other legislation has been proposed in Congress.
LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS
1971 was a productive year for consumer advocates but the most
45. 262 So.2d 452 (Fla. App. 1972). This procedure would seem adequate to
prevent "oppression" and "surprise." See Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith, 99
N.J. Super. 441, 240 A.2d 195 (1968) which seems to indicate that it would be
enough if the buyer's attention were specifically drawn to the limitations and ex-
plained in detail.
46. Illinois has reached this conclusion at an earlier date, denying the pro-
tection of a disclaimer in a warranty booklet which was not specifically pointed
out to the purchaser at the time of sale. Admiral Oasis Hotel Corp. v. Home Gas
Industries, Inc., 68 Ill. App. 2d 297, 216 N.E.2d 282 (1965). See also Overland
Bond and Investment Corp. v. Howard, 9 Ill. App. 3d 348, 356, 292 N.E.2d 168
(1972) for a spurious distinction between "good condition" and "present condi-
tion" in order to deny effect to a disclaimer.
47. Williams v. College Dodge, Inc., 11 UCC Rep. Serv. 958 (D.C. Mich.
1972). Contra, Architectural Aluminum Corp. v. Macarr, Inc., 70 Misc. 2d 495,
333 N.Y.S.2d 818 (Sup. Ct. 1972). While holding that the UCC does not require
actual knowledge by the buyer of the disclaimer, the court pointed out that the
seller and the buyer had many dealings on prior occasions.
48. NATIONAL CONSUMER AcT § 3.302. See also NATIONAL CONSUMER ACT
§ 3.304 which eliminates privity requirements and NATIONAL CONSUMER ACT
§ 3.301(2) which defines "merchantability" as including a warranty that "the
goods conform in all material respects to applicable state and federal statutes and
regulations establishing standards of quality and safety of goods .... ." The
National Consumer Act is a model act for consumer protection prepared by the
National Consumer Law Center, Boston College Law School.
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astonishing of all the legislative proposals was Senator Magnuson's Con-
sumer Product Warranties and Federal Trade Commission Improvements
Act.49  This bill proposed three major changes to warranty law. First,
the FTC is empowered by this Act to make rules and regulations govern-
ing written warranties for consumer goods costing over $5.00. These rules
and regulations may establish the standards for a "full warranty." Any
product which does not have a warranty which meets these standards
must be clearly labeled to indicate its coverage."0 Second, warranties
implied by state law cannot be disclaimed. Third, purchasers who pre-
vail in litigation against sellers or manufacturers are entitled to recover
damages, costs and attorney's fees. Aside from the fact that Senator Mag-
nuson was not able to convince his opponents 5 ' of the soundness of his
49. S. 986, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); Fair Warranty Disclosure Act, S. 1221,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) a companion bill. The predecessor of these bills,
S. 3074, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) was passed by the Senate. Among other
consumer bills proposed in 1971 are: Consumer Class Action Act, S. 984, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); Consumer Fraud Prevention Act, S. 1222, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1971); Consumer Product Warranties and Federal Trade Commission
Improvements Act, H.R. 4809, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); Warranty Protection
Act, H.R. 10673, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.; Consumer Products Warranty and Guar-
anty Act, H.R. 5037, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). See also Exec. Order No.
11,583, 36 Fed. Reg. 3509 (1971) establishing an Office of Consumer Affairs and
declaring "buyers' rights": (1) the right to make an intelligent choice among
products and services; (2) the right to accurate information on which to make a
free choice; (3) the right to expect that the health and safety of buyer is taken
into account by those who seek his patronage; (4) the right to register dissatisfac-
tion and have complaint heard and weighed, when a buyer's interests are badly
served.
50. The minimum standards for inclusion in the "full warranty" are: (1) it
would have to promise to repair or replace without charge any such malfunctioning
or defective product within a reasonable time or make a refund; (2) it would be
prohibited from placing unreasonable duties on the purchaser for securing the
warranty performance; (3) if the purchaser misused or failed to maintain the
product, the warrantor would not be required to repair or replace; (4) although
implied warranties could not be disclaimed, they can be limited in duration as long
as reasonable, conscionable and conspicuous. This bill is a significant improve-
ment over the warranty provisions in the UCC particularly because of its empha-
sis upon clear communication to the consumer of the extent of his warranty pro-
tection.
51. Senators Ribicoff and Percy have introduced a bill this year, S. 707, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), which if passed would establish a Consumer Protection
Agency. Presumably this agency could require a warranty similar to the one
conceived by Senator Magnuson in 1971. In addition, H.R. 6168, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. § 207 (1973) establishes an Office of Consumer Counselor which is em-
powered to examine any matter before the President with respect to economic
stabilization, require public hearings, and advise consumers.
It was argued when Sen. Magnuson's bill was introduced that the legislation
would deaden competition, drive up prices and preempt the prerogative of state
legislatures. The counter of this argument is that if the manufacturer is pro-
hibited from disclaiming liability, he will either increase prices to cover his dam-
19731
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
bill, there are two defects: (1) the full warranty is voluntary; (2) there
is no provision to invalidate waiver of defense clauses.
There have been a few attempts in legal literature to improve upon
legislative suggestions, but they all share a glaring defect52-they do not
adequately grapple with the problem of consumer ignorance and sense of
futility. None of them seem to realize that a consumer will benefit
from their legislation only if he is adequately educated, financed, and
angry enough to sustain himself through an extensive litigation process.
CONCLUSION
It must be apparent that the law which protects consumers from de-
fective products is in great need of revision. The Uniform Commercial
Code serves primarily commercial interests by attempting to maintain free-
dom of contract. However, the normal restraints of competition and
free enterprise do not operate to check the detrimental effects of dis-
claimers, integration and waiver of defense clauses, limitation of remedies,
and the parol evidence rule. Sellers have used the Code to formulate
form contracts to completely avoid liability for defective products. In re-
sponse, some have suggested that unconscionability could be used to pro-
tect the consumer. Others have tried obscure legal theories which have
served to increase the confusion and disarray of the law. Still others have
suggested piecemeal legislation which is inadequate in vision. None of
these tactics have succeeded.
We need legislation which provides uniformity, which adequately in-
forms both the consumer and the manufacturer of their rights and obliga-
tions and which provides meaningful remedies for both. We have pro-
posed a National Warranty Act which if enacted will accomplish these
goals. More importantly, it will eliminate the primary culprit in the
"consumer predicament"-the disclaimer. This Act is proposed as a na-
tional act because amendments to the UCC are ultimately too burden-
some for the manufacturer who would have to mold his warranties to all
the variations which would be imposed by the states.
ages, or he will increase the quality of the product. The manufacturing of a
given product will only cease if that product is so defective that competition is
impossible.
52. A Federal Consumer Products Liability Act, 7 HARV. J. LEGIS. 568 (1970);
Note, 12 WM. & MARY L. REV. 895 (1971); 34 ALBANY L. REV. 339 (1970) which
includes a good proposal for the invalidation of the waiver of defense clause. See
also Eovaldi and Gestrin, Justice for Consumers: The Mechanisms of Redress,
66 Nw. U. L. REV. 281 (1971), which suggests the development of non-judicial






§ 1-1 DECLARATION OF PURPOSE
It is the purpose of this Act to provide a uniform written warranty to
accompany manufactured consumer products which are in or affecting
interstate commerce. This warranty is expressed in simply understood
terms, with remedies clearly stated, in order to assure full disclosure of
warranty terms to consumers. The remedies provided to the consumer
in this warranty are meaningful and efficient. This warranty will also
provide manufacturers of consumer products with a clear conception of
the nature of their duties and responsibilities to the consumer. No pro-
visions of any state law or the Uniform Commercial Code shall have the
effect of limiting or modifying the protection given to consumers by this
Act.
§ 1-2 SCOPE OF THE ACT
This Act will encompass:
1. The sale or lease to consumers of new consumer products with a
manufacturer's selling price of $5.00 or more.
2. Sales of utilities, gasoline, fuel oil, food, drug and cosmetic prod-
ucts are excluded from the coverage of this Act.
3. The warranty provisions of this Act become operative only upon
the purchase or lease by a consumer of consumer products.
§ 1-3 DEFINITIONS
1-3.1 Consumer-Any natural person, not a merchant with respect to
the goods, who purchases a consumer product and uses such product pri-
marily for personal, family, household or agricultural purposes.53
1-3.2 Consumer Product-Any new manufactured product pur-
chased or leased by a consumer from a merchant and used by the con-
sumer primarily for personal, family, household or agricultural pur-
poses.54
53. The term "consumer" was adapted from both the UCC § 9-109(1) and
the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1602(h) (1970).
54. "Consumer product" is defined to distinguish this class of goods from "com-
mercial products," primarily because a basic tenet of the Uniform Commercial
Code-the ability of contracting parties to bargain over terms of a sale, including
the terms of warranty protection-is operative in commercial transactions between
merchants. Not only does a businessman have much greater financial leverage in
1973]
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1-3.3 Defective-A defective consumer product is an article which is
not fit for the ordinary purposes for which it is intended to be used or
is likely to be used by the consumer, or which does not conform to the
promises or affirmations made on the container or label, if any, or which
is not in conformity with all state and federal regulations governing the
safety and quality of the product, or which contains defects in materials
or workmanship. 55
1-3.4 First Purchaser-When used with respect to consumer goods
the term means the first person, other than a merchant, to whom posses-
sion thereof is transferred pursuant to a retail sale or lease. In the case
where possession is first transferred to an agent or employee of a dealer
with the expectation that such consumer goods will subsequently be
sold or leased as part of the agent or employee's normal business, and
such subsequent sale or lease does take place, the purchaser or lessee
under such subsequent sale or lease shall be considered a first pur-
chaser.56
1-3.5 Household Appliance-Any article, product, machine or de-
vice which is manufactured, produced or assembled primarily for use as
a fixture in private residences or for any other household or family use,
and which is operated by electrical energy, gas, gasoline or any other
petroleum product. 57
1-3.6 Manufacturer-For purposes of this Act, manufacturer means
any person engaged in business in or affecting interstate commerce, who
buying manufactured products than does a consumer, the businessman is also likely
to be more sophisticated in making his purchases and aware of the meaning of
warranties presented to him. See 7 HARV. J. LEGIS. 568, 575 (1970).
55. The definition of the word "defective" stems from the merchantability re-
quirements codified in the UCC. Because these requirements are known to all
parties in the distribution chain, this Act purposely brings the definition of "de-
fective" close to the UCC definition of "unmerchantable." This term is one upon
which there exists a judicial "gloss" which will assist the courts in their interpre-
tation of this Act. See Franklin, When Worlds Collide, 18 STAN. L. REv. 974,
979-80 (1966). Although the definition of this term is quite broad, "defective"
does not include mere buyer dissatisfaction or disappointment with a particular
consumer product.
56. "First purchaser" was defined to preclude evasion of the warranty require-
ments of this Act by schemes in which an unscrupulous dealer would make "paper
sales" of his products to an employee or agent, then repurchase the product and
sell it to a "regular" buyer in the normal course of business. This subsequent
buyer, under such a scheme, would not technically be the first purchaser of the
product. Comment, Consumer Protection and Warranties of Quality-Proposal for
a Statutory Warranty in Sales to Consumers, 34 ALBANY L. REV. 339, 365 (1970).
57. This definition was adapted from that of "household appliance" contained
in H.R. 20, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). At the time this comment was being
written, hearings on the bill were being held.
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manufactures, produces or assembles a product that will be purchased
by a consumer and used as a consumer product. 58
1-3.7 Manufacturer's Selling Price-The unit price at which a man-
ufacturer sells a product to a wholesaler, distributor, retailer, or other
merchant for resale, or the price at which the manufacturer sells a prod-
uct directly to a consumer. 59
1-3.8 Merchant-A person who deals in goods of the kind or other-
wise by his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill
peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the transaction or to whom
such knowledge or skill may be attributed by his employment of an
agent or broker or other intermediary who by his occupation holds him-
self out as having such knowledge or skill. 60
1-3.9 Motor Vehicle-Every self-propelled vehicle, in, upon or by
which any person or property is or may be transported or drawn upon
a highway, except devices used exclusively upon stationary rails or
tracks.61
1-3.10 Products Sold as Seconds-A product sold as a "second" is a
product which is not defective except that such "second" may contain de-
fects in materials or workmanship.6 2
58. For purposes of this Act, "manufacturer" does not refer to persons or com-
panies which produce component parts that subsequently will be used by another
person or company in the production of a "finished" product. However, even
though final assembly of an article that will be sold as a consumer product is not
done by the manufacturer-that is, if a product is intended to be sold to a con-
sumer disassembled or if a merchant is required to assemble or add to the product
prior to its sale to a consumer-the manufacturer of this "final but disassembled"
product must accompany it with a Statutory Warranty. Persons who are not "en-
gaged in the business" of manufacturing goods-such as one who occasionally
sells handcrafted articles made as a hobby, or one who sells his personal car to
another-do not come within the definition of "manufacturer."
59. This "price" is defined in the Act for two reasons. First, the Statutory
Warranty need not be given to articles sold for less than $5.00 by the manu-
facturer to a merchant for resale as a consumer product, and second, the duration
of the warranty period is directly related to the price of the product.
60. The definition of "merchant" is taken verbatim from § 2-104(1) of the
Uniform Commercial Code. A merchant may be a manufacturer, wholesaler, re-
tailer, or dealer who sells directly to consumers.
61. The definition of "motor vehicle" is adapted from ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95%,
§§ 1-146 and 1-217 (1970).
62. Many consumers search for items sold as "seconds" in order to obtain a
cheaper price for a brand name product. This Act will not prohibit manufacturers
from selling "seconds," but such products must be accompanied by a statutory war-
ranty from the manufacturer. The definition of "defective" in a warranty given
with a "second," however, may be slightly altered by the warrantor. See note 71
and accompanying text infra.
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1-3.11 Related Creditor-Any person, partnership, corporation or
association which has made or is making loans to consumers to enable
payment to be made for consumer products or services and which either
participates in or is connected with the consumer sale or lease transac-
tion. Without limiting the scope of the immediately preceding language,
the creditor participates in or is connected with the consumer sale or lease
transaction under any one of the following circumstances:
(1) The creditor is a person related by blood or marriage to the
seller or the seller's spouse.
(2) The creditor prepared, supplied or furnished the seller with the
forms or documents used to evidence or secure the consumer loan.
(3) The seller prepared, supplied or furnished the creditor with the
forms or documents used to evidence or secure the consumer loan.
(4) The creditor is directly or indirectly controlled by, under com-
mon control of, or is otherwise affiliated with the seller.
(5) The creditor and the seller are engaged in a joint venture or are
in cooperation or combination to produce consumer obligations payable
either directly or by transfer to the creditor.
(6) The creditor, directly or indirectly, pays the seller or lessor any
consideration whether or not it is in connection with the particular trans-
action.
(7) The seller guaranteed the consumer loan or otherwise assumed
the risk of loss by the creditor upon the loan.
(8) The creditor made five or more loans within a one-year period
the proceeds of which were used in transactions with the same seller
following referral of the consumer to the creditor by the seller.
(9) The creditor knew or had reason to know that the loan proceeds
would be used in whole or in substantial part to pay the seller for an ob-
ligation of the consumer, and the creditor had notice that the seller failed
or refused to perform contracts with consumers, or failed to remedy com-
plaints within a reasonable time.63
1-3.12 Sale-A sale consists in the passing of title from the seller to
the buyer for a price. 64
63. "Related creditor" is defined in the National Consumer Act § 2.407 and
in the Revised Proposed Trade Regulation Rule, 38 Fed. Reg. 892 (1973). The
definition used herein is adapted from both sources.




§ 2-1 STATUTORY WARRANTY
The manufacturer of all consumer products within the scope of this




(Date of Purchase--to be filled in by Seller)
THE MANUFACTURER WARRANTS THAT:
1. This product is not defective. Defective means an article which
is not fit for the ordinary purpose for which it is intended to be used or
is likely to be used by the consumer, or which does not conform to the
promises or affirmations made on the container or label, if any, or which
is not in conformity with all state and federal regulations governing
the safety and quality of the product (or which contains defects in ma-
terials or workmanship). 65
2. If the product is defective, the manufacturer will repair or replace
it without charge and within a reasonable time following notification by
the consumer of the defect to the manufacturer or his appointed agent.
If such repair or replacement is inadequate, the buyer may return the
defective product to the manufacturer and the manufacturer will re-
fund the sales price to the buyer. Costs of shipping the defective product
to be repaired shall be borne by the manufacturer.
3. If the manufacturer refuses to repair, replace or refund the sales
price of the defective product within a reasonable time, the purchaser
of this product is entitled to take any and all of the following action:
a. File a complaint with the Federal Trade Commission. That
agency shall file a suit on the buyer's behalf if, upon investiga-
tion of the complaint, the Federal Trade Commission determines
that the product is defective.
65. The bracketed phrase may be deleted by the manufacturer if the consumer
product is being sold as a "second." See note 71 and accompanying text infra.
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b. If any balance of the purchase price is outstanding at the
time and the manufacturer has refused to repair or replace the de-
fective product, the buyer may withhold payments from the
holder of his obligation for the balance of the purchase price, if
the product was purchased on an installment plan, revolving
charge and any other open-end credit account such as a bank
credit card, or if the purchase of the consumer product was fi-
nanced through a related creditor. The buyer will resume pay-
ments to the holder of his obligation upon the manufacturer's re-
pair or replacement of the defective product, or upon refund, by
the manufacturer, of the purchase price of the consumer product.
No additional interest shall accrue during the time the con-
sumer is withholding payments. 66
c. Bring an action in any competent court on his own behalf.
d. Pursue any other remedies available under law and equity.
4. This warranty will not apply and the manufacturer will not be re-
quired to repair or replace the defective product, nor refund the pur-
chase price, if the buyer fails to comply with any reasonable instructions
from the manufacturer regarding the operation and maintenance of this
product and the defect is a direct and proximate result of such non-
compliance.6 7
5. Operating costs, and ordinary and normal maintenance costs,
66. This paragraph of the Statutory Warranty is one of the most important
provisions of the Act. The elimination of waiver of defense clauses, coupled with
the fact that the Statutory Warranty may not be disclaimed, will provide the con-
sumer with an effective non-judicial tool which he may use to obtain satisfaction for
a defective consumer product. Through this Act, the consumer may assert any de-
fenses he may have not only against a party who has allowed him to purchase a
consumer product on credit, but also against a party who comes within the defini-
tion of "related creditor." The inclusion of "related creditor" will permit a
consumer to assert claims and defenses against creditors who pretend to insulate
themselves from consumer sales transactions by claiming that they are only lenders
having nothing to do with the seller. See National Consumer Act, § 2.407(f), and
the comment following.
67. Clear and explicit instructions on the operation, maintenance and care of a
consumer product may and should be prepared and included with the product by
the manufacturer. If periodic service is required, as in the case of motor vehicles,
the manufacturer may require the consumer to prove such service was obtained by
including with the instruction booklet coupons to be stamped or filled in by the
servicing party. It is unreasonable to require a manufacturer to accept responsi-
bility for a product which becomes "defective" as a direct result of consumer
neglect or misuse. However, if there are no instructions provided, or if the in-
structions given are unreasonable, the consumer will have no means of knowing
the requirements and limitations of the product, and would not be responsible, un-
der such circumstances, for the defects that might occur.
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which may be specified in the instruction booklet provided by the manu-
facturer, shall be borne by the consumer. 68
6. The duration of the warranty period is ------- (to be filled in by
the Manufacturer in accordance with Section 2-2 of this Act).
§ 2-2 DURATION OF WARRANTY
The Statutory Warranty shall be effective for the following time periods:
1. At least one year for household appliances with a manufacturer's
selling price of less than $100.
2. At least five years for household appliances with a manufactur-
er's selling price of more than $100.
3. At least three years or 36,000 miles for motor vehicles. 69
4. At least one year for all other consumer products which are not
household appliances or motor vehicles with a manufacturer's selling
price of less than $100.
5. At least five years for all other consumer products which are not
household appliances or motor vehicles with a manufacturer's selling
price of more than $100.
§ 2-3 SELLER MAY PROVIDE WARRANTY 70
Any seller may assume the duties, responsibilities and liabilities im-
posed upon the manufacturer by this Act so long as:
1. The seller provides to each purchaser of consumer products the
full Statutory Warranty.
68. This section of the warranty is directed principally, but not solely, toward
costs incurred in owning and operating a motor vehicle. It should be pointed out
by the manufacturer to the consumer that "operating costs, and ordinary and
normal maintenance costs" include such items as gasoline, oil, ordinary tune-ups,
spark plugs, points, and other ordinary service parts and service charges.
69. Since most automobiles are financed over a three-year period, it is rea-
sonable to allow warranty protection at least for that span of time. The 36,000
mileage figure was chosen because major automobile manufacturers generally use a
ratio of 12,000 miles per year in their warranties. Comment, Consumer Protection
and Warranties of Quality-Proposal for a Statutory Warranty in Sales to Con-
sumers, 34 ALBANY L. REV. 339, 367 (1970).
70. Since many merchants want consumers to identify the seller, rather than
the actual manufacturer, as the source of the consumer product, this Act will not
preclude that practice. By agreement, the seller and manufacturer may provide
that the required Statutory Warranty will be extended to the consumer by the
seller himself. Underlying this provision, however, is the assumption that the
manufacturer is acting in good faith and is not coercing the seller to accept lia-
bilities imposed by the Statutory Warranty.
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2. The warranty provided by the seller shall be identical to that re-
quired of the manufacturer by this Act, except the seller shall delete the
word "manufacturer" and substitute the word "seller" in the body of the
Statutory Warranty.
3. All provisions of this Act shall become applicable against the seller
instead of against the manufacturer.
4. The seller makes no disclaimers or modifications of the Statutory
Warranty.
§ 2-4 WARRANTY TO BE APPLIED TO PRODUCTS SOLD AS SECONDS 7 1
1. The written Statutory Warranty provided for in this Act shall ac-
company consumer products sold as "seconds," except that the words "or
which contains defects in materials or workmanship" may be deleted
by the manufacturer from the definition of the term "defective" used in
Paragraph 1 of the Statutory Warranty.
2. A product to be sold as a "second" shall be clearly and conspicu-
ously labeled "second."
§ 2-5 APPLICATION OF STATUTORY WARRANTY
The warranty required by this Act shall become effective at the time the
first purchaser who is a consumer purchases consumer products. If the
minimum duration of the warranty period has not expired at the time the
first purchaser, as a consumer, sells the item to a subsequent purchaser
who is a consumer, the warranty shall extend to such subsequent pur-
chaser if that subsequent purchaser can show the first purchaser reason-
ably complied with the manufacturer's instructions for the operation and
maintenance of the product. The warranty to the subsequent purchaser
shall not be extended beyond its stated duration period, which period
began to run at the time of purchase by the first purchaser. 72
71. As long as a product is conspicuously labeled "second," the manufacturer
may delete the bracketed phrase in paragraph one of the Statutory Warranty.
The consumer is thereby allowed warranty recovery for a product that stops func-
tioning as it should, but that consumer may not complain about surface scratches,
pulled threads, or other faults which affect the appearance of the item.
72. The Statutory Warranty may run with the consumer goods and be extended
to subsequent purchasers who buy directly from the first purchaser consumer.
Reasonable compliance by the first purchaser with the operating and maintenance
instructions, for purposes of this section of the statute, may be shown by the first
purchaser's affidavit given by him to the subsequent purchaser, or by the completion
of any accompanying service manual that was required to be filled in or marked at
the time of service of the product. When the first purchaser consumer sells the
product to a merchant, however, the warranty does not continue in operation.
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§ 2-6 LOCATION OF THE STATUTORY WARRANTY
The manufacturer shall cause the Statutory Warranty provided for in
this Act to be printed in a conspicuous manner on a document, card or
booklet which shall be included in or attached to the package in which the
consumer product is contained, if any, or attached to the consumer prod-
uct itself, or delivered by the seller to the consumer at the time of sale of
the consumer product.
§ 2-7 MANUFACTURER MAY APPOINT MERCHANT AS AGENT
The manufacturer may appoint a merchant as the agent of the manu-
facturer to repair or replace a defective consumer product. If such ap-
pointment is made by the manufacturer, the merchant performing as the
agent shall be reimbursed by the manufacturer for the cost of replac-
ing the consumer product, or for the costs of performing the necessary
repair, including the costs of parts and labor.
§ 2-8 MANUFACTURER SHALL REIMBURSE COSTS OF REPAIR
If emergency or necessity on the part of a consumer requires the im-
mediate repair or replacement of a defective consumer product, and such
immediate repair or replacement is secured by the consumer at his own
expense, the manufacturer shall reimburse the consumer for the costs
incurred by such repair or replacement.73
SECTION I
§ 3-1 CONSUMER REMEDIES
Remedies under this Act are enumerated in the Statutory Warranty (Sec-
tion 2-1). However, such enumerated remedies do not preclude the
right of a consumer to seek any other remedies available to him in law
or equity.
§ 3-2 MANUFACTURER'S RIGHT OF ACTION
If a consumer product becomes damaged or defective after it leaves
the control of the manufacturer, and such damage or defect subjects the
A manufacturer should not be held responsible under the Statutory Warranty for a
product sold as used or reconditioned by a merchant.
73. Frequently, products such as automobiles, washing machines, stoves, etc.,
are used daily by the consumer. Any delay in repairing such product--even a
"reasonable" delay as allowed in this statute-could impose great inconvenience
and hardship upon the consumer. Therefore, this provision of the Act entitles
him to make arrangements for repair as quickly as possible and receive reimburse-
ment for the costs from the manufacturer.
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manufacturer to liability to a consumer under the terms of this Act, the
manufacturer shall have a right of action against the merchant, shipper,
or other person whose actions proximately caused the damage or defect.
§ 3-3 SANCTIONS FOR NON-COMPLIANCE
If the manufacturer of a consumer product under the scope of this Act
fails to accompany such product with a Statutory Warranty, the Federal
Trade Commission shall proceed against the manufacturer in a court
of competent jurisdiction to enjoin the placing of the non-warranted con-
sumer products in the stream of commerce.
§ 3-4 MANUFACTURER'S DEFENSES
If the buyer of a consumer product fails to reasonably comply with the
instructions for normal operation and maintenance of the consumer
product, if such instructions are provided by the manufacturer, the non-
complying consumer shall have no right of action against the manu-
facturer under this Act arising from defects which are the direct and proxi-
mate result of such non-compliance.
1. The burden of showing consumer non-compliance shall be borne
by the manufacturer.
2. Non-compliance with instructions for normal operation and main-
tenance of the consumer product shall cut off the right of action by the
consumer only under the warranty provided in this Act. Such non-com-
pliance shall not be considered assumption of risk or contributory neg-
ligence on the part of the consumer, and shall not negate the consumer's
right to bring other actions against the manufacturer.
§ 3-5 ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS
1. In suits brought by individual consumers as plaintiffs, a court
may, in its discretion, award reasonable attorney's fees and costs to a
consumer bringing an action under this Act.
2. In suits brought as class actions, a court may award reasonable at-
torney's fees and costs to the class of consumer plaintiffs bringing an
action under this Act if judgment is awarded in favor of the consumer
class.
§ 3-6 AGGREGATION OF CLAIMS IN CLASS ACTIONS
Consumers bringing a class action under this Act in courts of the United
States may aggregate their claims in order to attain the amount in con-
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troversy exceeding $10,000, exclusive of interest or costs, as required
under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332.
§ 3-7 LIMITATIONS
Any action under this Act must be brought in any court of competent
jurisdiction within one year from the date of the occurrence of the viola-
tion of the provisions of this Act.
§ 3-8 SEVERABILITY
If any provision or clause of this Act or application thereof to any
person or circumstances is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect
other provisions or applications of the Act which can be given effect with-
out the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions
of this Act are declared to be severable.74
Shane H. Anderson
Wendy U. Larsen
74. This section is taken verbatim from § 1-108 of the Uniform Commercial
Code.
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